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LGBT RIGHTS
as Britain prepares to leave 
the European Union
N O T E  O N  L A N G U A G E
In th is repor t we use LGBTI 
to mean the whole LGBTQI+ 
communi ty,  in accordance wi th 
Gay Star News s ty le.  In the 
case of European r ights and 
protec tions,  i t  i s  of ten more 
accurate to re fer to LGBT  or to 
jus t LGB ,  so we have used those 
in i t ia l i sms where appropr ia te.
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At times when either as individuals or as a nation we 
face great and unprecedented change, we need more 
certainty not less.
Reassurance is absolutely necessary if we are to em-
bark upon a journey whose destination we do not 
know, and on a journey that needs to unite this divided 
country rather than imperil it.
Passionate words maybe, and I make no excuses for 
them. It is how I have argued in the defence of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU during our 
debates in the House of Lords on our withdrawal from 
the European Union.
We have been told time and time again by the gov-
ernment, and some legal experts that we do not need 
the Charter, that it is unnecessary because the rights 
already exist in other domestic legislation and interna-
tional conventions.
That is plainly untrue. But if that was the case, then 
why is it that this is the one piece of EU law this gov-
ernment refuses to carry forward after we leave the 
European Union? This government, which has consis-
tently questioned judgements on human rights and 
questioned whether we need to be committed to in-
ternational human rights obligations.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights is a stunning re-
affirmation that rights will be protected against gov-
ernments who would not otherwise give them, or wish 
to take them away. It is a Charter that has helped to 
progress human rights in other parts of the world too. 
It remains a powerful tool.
Again, as I said in the House of Lords, when it comes 
to human rights and civil liberties I want more guaran-
tees, even repeats of those guarantees, not less.
The report you are about to read is a powerful remind-
er that if we do nothing, then we could potentially lose 
all. They have woven together the story of the evolu-
tion of the protection of rights, including LGBT rights, 
that might never have happened had it not been for 
persistence, vision and courage. A group of nations 
acting together to ensure that the past would never 
be repeated and that voiceless minorities, however un-
popular, would be protected.
30 years ago I never believed that any government, not 
even a Conservative government in the United King-
dom would’ve brought forward a piece of legislation 
to further undermine and indeed stigmatise a commu-
nity battling against AIDS and HIV. It happened. Sec-
tion 28 happened. It was politically expedient and our 
Parliament passed it.
This should be our reminder that, in the landscape of 
human rights, we always need to guard against the un-
expected. The Charter is one of our guardians, and 
this story is it’s evolution. 
B Y  L O R D  C A S H M A N
F O R E W O R D
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You may think it is inevitable, in the complexity of the 
Brexit negotiations, that the needs of minorities, in-
cluding LGBTI people, will be overlooked.
We have certainly seen no evidence that the UK Gov-
ernment has paid any attention to LGBTI citizens in the 
Brexit process. And so, with this report, we take it on 
ourselves to assess the impact of Brexit on our commu-
nity and to provide recommendations.
The UK Government’s current view is that they can jetti-
son the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – the highest 
standard of protection for LGBTI people currently avail-
able in international law – as superfluous. That certainly 
indicates trouble may lie ahead.
If you think that your sexuality or gender identity has 
little to do with what you stand to lose in the Brexit pro-
cess, this report may alarm you. It sets out that LGBT 
rights have been driven forward by our EU membership 
and are underwritten by it. And it argues that LGBT 
people are even more likely than others to use rights 
granted by the EU.
The UK Government has stated we will not lose LGBT 
rights on the day we exit the EU. That is likely true, 
although this report shows we will lose benefits. More-
over, Europe will no longer drive the agenda on sexu-
ality and gender identity rights in the UK, as it has  for 
two decades.
Even more seriously, we will lose the EU’s guarantees 
on the rights we have. LGBT Britons have frequently 
relied on those guarantees and there is no UK consti-
tution to replace them. LGBT people in this country 
remember the spectre of Section 28. We know there-
fore, that an unfriendly future government can enshrine 
homophobia or transphobia in law. Our UK community 
is also well connected to LGBTIs in other parts of the 
world and has witnessed many examples of politicians 
reversing their rights with devastating consequences.
Britain has advanced in its overall attitudes to LGBTI 
people. But many of the senior UK politicians backing 
Brexit have openly homophobic and transphobic re-
cords. Trusting the future of the rights we have worked 
so hard to achieve to their goodwill seems to me to be 
reckless.
Immediately after the June 2016 Brexit vote, we saw 
that attitudes can rapidly change on the streets. In July, 
August and September of that year, hate crimes against 
LGBTI people rose 147%, measured against the same 
period in 2015.
As a community we can pretend this danger isn’t loom-
ing. Or we can do what we have always done – take 
responsibility personally and collectively for the pro-
tection and promotion of our rights. I believe we are 
well-motivated to act. A straw poll carried out by Gay 
Star News just before the 2016 Brexit vote indicated 
that 77% of our readers wished to remain. More gener-
ally, polling since the referendum has seen a slow, but 
consistent, shift to scepticism about Brexit.
Brexiteers have argued that pro-EU voices in the UK 
should silently accept the course they are now plotting 
for us. But it is an exercise in democracy to openly ar-
gue for the future we wish to see.
I am deeply indebted to the report’s authors for taking 
on my commission pro-bono and for providing their un-
paralleled expertise on this subject. I hope their words 
will be read with care, and their warnings heeded, be-
fore it is too late.
B Y  T R I S  R E I D - S M I T H
E D I T O R ’ S  F O R E W O R D
BREXIT: THE LGBT IMPACT ASSESSMENT LGBT RIGHTS AS BRITAIN PREPARES TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION
5
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
JONATHAN 
COOPER
Jonathan Cooper is a barrister at 
Doughty Street Chambers, Lon-
don and he is an internationally recognised human 
rights specialist. Jonathan was involved in a num-
ber of important LGBTI human rights cases, includ-
ing the UK’s gays in the armed forces case before 
the European Court of Human Rights, and cases 
establishing equal treatment rights for trans peo-
ple across the EU. He has assisted LGBTI people in 
countries which criminalise homosexuality to bring 
legal challenges in Belize, Kenya, Uganda, Jamai-
ca and Indonesia, among others. He has petitioned 
the UN, as well as the Inter-American system and 
worked within the African human rights framework. 
In 2007, the Queen awarded Jonathan an OBE for 
services to human rights.
PETER
DUNNE
Peter Dunne is a Lecturer in Law 
at the University of Bristol. His re-
search interests lie in the areas of family law, Europe-
an Union law and human rights. Peter’s scholarship 
has a particular focus on gender, sexuality and law. 
Prior to entering academia, Peter worked as a human 
rights advocate in the United States and Europe. 
KEINA 
YOSHIDA
Keina Yoshida is a barrister spe-
cialising in the areas of inquests 
and public inquiries, court of protection, action 
against the police, and equality and non-discrimi-
nation law. She is passionate about women’s hu-
man rights and LGBT rights and has acted in cas-
es before the European Court of Human Rights, 
and other international adjudication bodies. She 
is part of the Doughty Street International team 
and sits as an Advisory Board Member of the Cen-
tre for Women, Peace and Security at the London 
School of Economics (LSE). She is a Visiting Lectur-
er at City University where she teaches a masters 
course on international human rights law and prac-
tice and also supervises students at the Gender De-
partment at the LSE. She has a PhD in law and is 
part of the editorial board of Feminist Legal Stud-
ies. She publishes broadly on women’s rights and in 
2013 conducted research and authored the report 
Missing the Mark: LGBT Asylum Claims for UKLGIG.
ANYA
PALMER
Anya Palmer is a barrister at Old 
Square Chambers specialising in 
employment and discrimination law. Prior to being 
called to the bar in 1999, she worked for Stonewall 
from 1990 to 1998 campaigning for an equal age of 
consent, an end to the ban in the armed forces, and 
legislation against discrimination in the workplace.
BREXIT: THE LGBT IMPACT ASSESSMENT LGBT RIGHTS AS BRITAIN PREPARES TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION
6
A marvel of the 21st century has been the speed with 
which LGBTI equality has been fostered within the UK.
At the close of the 20th century, the only laws appli-
cable to the lesbian and gay community penalised and 
stigmatised us. There were specific criminal laws that 
only targeted gay men. There was an unequal age of 
consent and the odious Section 28 censored any discus-
sion of homosexuality in schools and blighted the lives 
of gay and lesbian people, particularly LGBTI youth.
No laws protected us. We could be fired or thrown out 
of our homes simply because our employers and/or 
landlords did not want queers in their workplace or in 
their properties. Infamously, in the mid-90s four mem-
bers of the armed forces had the temerity to challenge 
the fact that they’d been fired because they were gay 
and lesbian. They lost that legal challenge. English law 
upheld their dismissal. The future was bleak.
Yet a decade later UK law recognised the equality of 
lesbian, gay and bisexual people. The law for transgen-
der people was far from perfect but still ahead of that 
in most other countries. We would still need to make 
further progress in legislation and in society, but the 
principle of equality was firmly established.
And in 2016, when David Cameron resigned as Prime 
Minister, he heralded as one of his greatest successes 
the fact he had pushed through equal marriage, argu-
ably his finest legacy. Yet this was the same David Cam-
eron who as a new MP had voted to retain Section 28. 
The irony is not lost that it was a Conservative Prime 
Minister who introduced equal marriage and yet barely 
a decade earlier that party had fought tooth and nail 
INTRODUCTION
to keep LGBTI people marginalised and downtrodden.
Cameron adopts the language of Barack Obama. He re-
counts his story as that of a man who evolved on LGBTI 
rights. This is a dubious narrative. David Cameron is a 
good man. Of course, he was never homophobic, but 
when and why did it become politically expedient to 
promote LGBT rights?
The reality is that the UK’s journey towards full equality 
for LGBT people could not have happened without what 
we now call the European Union (EU) and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). And so when we reflect 
on, and cherish, that marvel which is LGBT equality, 
we must begin our journey with the EU. Could Camer-
on have evolved without the measures adopted under 
the auspices of the EU which made LGBT rights vote 
winners? Tony Blair and Gordon Brown’s governments 
are rightly credited for establishing LGBT equality, but 
could they have achieved what they did without the EU 
and regional guarantees of fundamental human rights?
In this report, we chart how the UK Government, Euro-
pean Union and the separate European Court of Human 
Rights have advanced LGBT rights, and how progress 
in this country has been dependent on our relationship 
with Europe, in particular the EU. In part two, we exam-
ine the rights LGBT Britain currently enjoys which Brexit 
may jeopardise, particularly in the areas of free move-
ment, trans rights, employment rights, relationship 
rights, asylum and rights guaranteed by the EU Charter.
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H O W  E U R O P E 
H A S  S H A P E D 
B R I T I S H 
L G B T  R I G H T S
P
hoto by Yannis P
apanastasopoulos
PA R T  O N E
We can pinpoint the date when the transformation in 
relation to gay and lesbian equality took place. The 
Amsterdam Treaty was signed on 2 October 1997. That 
treaty, which streamlined the EU and prepared it for 
the 21st century, created new competences for the 
European Union. It also consigned sexual orientation 
discrimination in the EU to the dustbin of history. Ar-
ticle 13 of that treaty put beyond doubt the fact that 
discrimination is incompatible with the single market:
‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Trea-
ty and within the limits of the powers conferred by it 
upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consult-
ing the European Parliament, may take appropriate 
action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial 
or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation.’
 
And the rest, as they say, is history.
 
Equality for transgender people developed in tan-
dem with ending sexual orientation discrimination, al-
though, as will be developed below, the trans equality 
journey followed a different, albeit less smooth, path. 
As well as providing the basis for LGBT equality in the 
UK, the drafting of Article 13 is also a perfect example 
of the democratic workings of the EU. The Council and 
Member States had shown little or no interest in sexual 
orientation and/or gender identity until this point. And 
until the late 1980s and the early 90s, the Commis-
sion fell in line with that position. But things began to 
change and there was a growing recognition that for 
the European Single Market to function effectively, it 
needed to be discrimination free. In 1991 the Commis-
sion requested that the European Human Rights Foun-
dation to undertake a comprehensive study on the sit-
uation of lesbains and gay men and, Homosexuality: a 
European Community Issue was published. Although 
the language used in the report might seem outdated 
by today’s standards, it importantly made it clear that 
discrimination against gay, lesbian and bisexual peo-
ple was clearly at odds with the ideals of the Single 
Market. 
Many MEPs had always been concerned by LGBT dis-
crimination. Since the first directly elected European 
Parliament in 1979, groupings of MEPs consistently ar-
gued for the protection of gay and lesbian people and 
Europe’s commitment to free movement enabled them 
to do this. And with free movement came the compe-
tence of the European institutions. At the same time, 
NGOs such as the International Lesbian and Gay Asso-
ciation (ILGA) and Égalité began to lobby the European 
institutions, particularly the Parliament. This three way 
dynamic between the Commission, the Parliament and 
civil society is an exemplar of democracy in action with-
in the context of the Single Market. MEPs carefully, but 
doggedly, created an unimpeachable position whereby 
the EU had to act to protect against LGBT discrimina-
tion. Initial attempts to put sexual orientation on the 
agenda, such as the Squarcialupi Report in 1984, had 
mixed success. It was a document before its time and 
nothing tangible came from it, but by 1994 the Roth Re-
port was adopted by the Parliament and it was to form 
the basis of what became Article 13 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty.
MEPs were then able to use their role in the Amsterdam 
process to ensure that Article 13 contained a prohibi-
tion on discrimination, including on grounds of sexual 
orientation. It was a masterclass in MEPs and civil soci-
ety working together. And in the end the Council had 
no choice but to accept the inclusion of sexual orien-
tation within Article 13 and with that the competence 
of the EU to end sexual orientation discrimination was 
beyond doubt.
 
Other forces also aligned to ensure that the Amsterdam 
Treaty would include protection for gay men and lesbi-
ans. The treaty was negotiated during the presidencies 
of the Italians, Dutch and Irish, all of whom had centre 
left and/or liberal leaning governments. Mary Robinson 
was President of Ireland and Romano Prodi was Italy’s 
Prime Minister. The Irish government had been partic-
ularly active in the process of ensuring sexual orienta-
tion was in the treaty from the outset. As holder of the 
Council presidency in the second half of 1996, Ireland 
proposed the original version of what would become 
Article 13.
ENDING SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
DISCRIMINATION
AS A PRINCIPLE OF EU CITIZENSHIP
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UK GOVERNMENT 
TRANSITIONS 
FROM OPPOSING EQUALITY 
TO WELCOMING IT
Meanwhile, UK Prime Minister John Major’s Conserva-
tive Government (1990-1997) had been clear that they 
would not support Article 13 in the form it was adopt-
ed. But Major was replaced by Tony Blair’s New Labour 
government at the general election in May 1997. So 
when the time came to agreeing the final text, in mid 
1997, Major’s Britain had been transformed by Blair’s 
optimism. These were the heady early days of Prime 
Minister Blair’s administration. New Labour had won a 
landslide election victory on a promise of rejecting all 
unjustified discrimination (widely seen as a euphemism 
for ending LGBT discrimination). And Blair’s Europe 
Minister, Doug Henderson, was committed to building 
human rights into the EU project.
These were early moments in the genesis of LGBT 
rights. The culture of Section 28 still pervaded across 
the UK. Technically this law prevented local authorities 
from ‘promoting’ homosexuality. Its effects were insid-
ious and wide-spread, but most notably, it was used to 
shut down any discussion of LGBTI issues in schools. 
Homosexuality was legal across the UK but with an un-
equal age of consent, by this point 18 for gay sexual 
activity, 16 for heterosexual sex.
Against this backdrop, the New Labour Government 
took small and tentative steps in relation to LGBT rights. 
And luckily for New Labour, their work had been done 
for them. By the time the text of the Amsterdam Treaty 
was finalised in June 1997, protection from discrimina-
tion on the grounds of sexual orientation was firmly en-
sconced in Article 13. Had the Conservatives remained 
in power, it would not have survived, but New Labour 
was very happy to go along with the new consensus.
The genius of Article 13 is that it was permissive. It 
didn’t mandate ending LGBT discrimination within EU 
law. ‘Should’ had been replaced with ‘may’. Expecta-
tions were low, but the zeal of the Commission with the 
support of the Council, and the EU’s new-found com-
petence, should not have been underestimated. The 
Amsterdam Treaty entered into force on 1 May 1999. 
If there’s ever a reason to doubt the marking of May 
Day, Article 13 becoming binding EU law proves why 
we should celebrate working people on that day. Hav-
ing previously guaranteed protections for women in the 
workplace, the Employment Equality Framework Direc-
tive quickly followed and became law in December 
2000. Its purpose: to combat discrimination on grounds 
of disability, sexual orientation, religion or belief and 
age in the workplace.
THE UK FOLLOWS 
THE EU
AND PUTS EQUALITY INTO PRACTICE
The UK had followed the EU’s lead and implemented 
Article 13. It subsequently gave effect to the EU’s Em-
ployment Equality Framework Directive. As such, the 
Labour Government had put themselves in a position 
to do the right thing, while providing political cover for 
doing so by being able to tell any critics that the rules 
came from Europe. Implementing Europe’s Directive 
required a complex domestic legal framework and the 
government took the maximum time allowed to draft it 
and to give employers and lawyers time to adjust to it. 
So the UK finally made the Employment Equality (Sex-
ual Orientation) Regulations 2003 law on 1 December 
2003. And with that, thanks to the EU and the new UK 
Government’s aspiration for equality, for the first-time, 
laws protected LGBT people at work.
It is now the Equality Act 2010 that gives effect to that 
Directive. Attempts to widen the protection of EU law 
in relation to LGBT discrimination to cover goods and 
services as well as employment have stalled for the time 
being, but as the UK chose to build in that protection 
for LGBT people into the Equality Act 2010, this frus-
trating technicality in relation to EU law (luckily) does 
not affect LGBT people in the UK.  
 
The story of Article 13 and how the EU came to protect 
LGBT people from discrimination is a fascinating one. 
Another reason for including sexual orientation within 
But at the time, only five countries in the EU had mea-
sures protecting against discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation: the Netherlands, France, Ireland, 
Spain and Finland. This makes the inclusion of sexual 
orientation within Article 13 even more remarkable, but 
the Irish were particularly committed to the provision 
and for the Dutch it seemed obvious.
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the Amsterdam Treaty was the anticipation that new 
member states from Eastern Europe would soon join; 
and prohibiting LGBT discrimination was not to be-
come negotiable.
 
For those who challenge the EU’s democratic cre-
dentials, the EU’s own relationship with LGBT rights 
suggests its detractors are wrong. A key principle of 
democracy is how democratic societies protect vulner-
able minorities who cannot get their voice heard. All 
the facets of the EU worked together to enshrine LGBT 
rights. Some of those involved stand out more than 
others. As we discussed earlier Ireland is an example of 
a country who drove the progressive agenda forward. 
Equally, MEPs built the case for LGBT equality within 
the Single Market. Key activists also played their part. 
None more so than Peter Ashman whose legacy lives 
on well beyond his untimely death. It was Peter who 
ensured that the Report, Homosexuality: A European 
Community Issue was published. It was Peter who ar-
ticulated those links between free movement and sex-
ual orientation discrimination. It was Peter who, as the 
director of the European Human Rights Foundation, 
ensured that organisations like ILGA were adequately 
funded. We in the LGBT communities in the UK and 
across the EU owe him so much.
THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
TAKES THE EU LEAD
An unanticipated consequence of the EU’s embrace of 
LGBT rights was that it appears to have motivated that 
other European institution, the Council of Europe and 
its European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, to 
raise the stakes where LGBT rights were concerned. The 
Council of Europe is, of course, separate to the EU and, 
in one sense bigger, with 47 member states covering 
820 million people, compared to the EU’s 28 states and 
510 million population. However, one clearly influences 
the other. It is no coincidence that the European Court 
of Human Rights widened its approach to the protec-
tion of LGBT people only after 1997 and the adoption 
of the Amsterdam Treaty. Prior to 1997 the Strasbourg 
Court had limited its protection of gay and lesbian hu-
man rights issues to decriminalisation of homosexuality. 
This included the equal age of consent, in the context 
of the UK.  
 
The limited way in which the European Convention on 
Human Rights was used to uphold the rights of LGBT 
people caused one of the authors of this Report to 
write, exasperated, in 1996 that perhaps it should be 
renamed as the European Convention on Heterosexual 
People’s Rights. However, once the Amsterdam Treaty 
was in force, the Strasbourg Court upped its game and 
upholding the human rights of LGBT people became 
the norm, whereas prior to 1999 it had been the excep-
tion. The Amsterdam Treaty demonstrates that times 
had changed, and that it was no longer acceptable for 
institutions to marginalise LGBT people and refuse to 
guarantee their fundamental human rights.
EUROPE, 
WESTMINSTER AND 
WHITEHALL
DRIVE CHANGE TOGETHER
We can’t know whether the Labour Governments under 
Tony Blair and his successor Gordon Brown would have 
gone out of their way to protect LGBT people without 
the cover of EU law. It is clear that Europe set an agen-
da, informed by its member states, and the democrat-
ically elected New Labour government in Westminster 
and Whitehall followed that lead. Blair prioritised dis-
mantling historic abuses, such as getting rid of Sec-
tion 28. He clearly wanted to establish an equal age 
of consent for homosexual and heterosexual activity at 
16; which ultimately came about following a decision 
by ECHR holding the UK in violation of the Convention 
on the subject of the unequal age of consent. European 
human rights law therefore required the government to 
end the disparity.
When it came to the ban on gay men and lesbians serv-
ing in the UK armed forces, this was again mandated by 
the ECHR. And, in fact, the UK Government fought the 
issue in the Strasbourg court.
It was also Strasbourg that demanded that the UK get 
rid of offences that only gay men can commit. The par-
ticular example of this was the offence of ‘gross inde-
cency’ which could only be committed by consenting 
men. That offence was committed if more than two 
men were involved. In ADT v UK, the European Court 
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of Human Rights held that offence violated the right 
to respect for private life. Virtually all major changes 
in relation to LGBT rights have their source in one or 
both European institution, either the EU or the Europe-
an Court.
 
There were attempts to litigate in relation to sexual ori-
entation discrimination at the EU level before the Am-
sterdam Treaty, but these had been unsuccessful (for 
example, Grant v SW Trains). This failure in relation to 
sexual orientation must be contrasted with the trans 
experience. The rights of trans people were driven by 
the Court of Justice of the EU. In 1996 they upheld the 
rights of a trans woman who was discriminated against 
at work (P v S & Cornwall County Council) – she was 
treated abysmally. They called it what it was – sex dis-
crimination – and thus transformed the lives of trans 
people across the EU. This case laid one of the main 
foundations for transforming the lives of trans people 
over the next two decades. The implications have been 
slow to materialise but it did mean that when a cis wom-
an discovered her trans male partner could not benefit 
from her NHS pension, she took a case to the Court of 
Justice of the EU and successfully established that this 
was also sex discrimination (KB v NHS Pension Agency).
 
The UK may have allowed gender reassignment surgery 
but before the EU court intervened, the UK was hope-
less in upholding trans people’s rights. Even the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights had been slow in holding 
the UK to account for keeping trans people in a legal 
purgatory, until, finally, in 2002, that Court got around 
to upholding the rights of trans people (Goodwin v UK). 
And since then, the UK has actively sought to ensure 
the rights of trans people under all circumstances are 
protected.
 
None of these changes would have happened without 
European institutions and the EU in particular. It has 
been the EU that has been the driving force behind 
LGBT equality. Without the EU’s commitment to our 
equality, would the UK Government have heard our 
voices?
Civil partnerships and then equal marriage suggest they 
might have, but without the EU, would the stage have 
been set? It is also fair to say that, while not directed 
by the EU, the movement for marriage equality in Brit-
ain was inspired and emboldened by the leadership of 
EU and Single Market peers who had already legislat-
ed for same-sex marriage. The Netherlands, Belgium, 
Spain, Norway, Sweden, Iceland and France all imple-
mented marriage equality before England, Wales and 
Scotland. Campaigners in the UK certainly cited these 
examples in arguing for marriage equality, suggesting 
Britain needed to keep pace with our European part-
THE EU CHARTER 
OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS
RAISES LEVELS OF PROTECTION
By the late 90s it was clear that human rights protec-
tion within the EU was too diffuse. It was therefore de-
cided that the human rights that people within the EU 
should be able to take for granted should be set out 
in one document, and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights was conceived. The UK was actively involved in 
the drafting process. That document was adopted in 
2000 and it became legally binding in 2009 across the 
EU. It was drafted with the expectation that it would be 
legally enforceable.
The Charter is a remarkable statement of 21st century 
human rights guarantees. It is the only legally binding 
international human rights document that expressly 
protects against discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation. As such it makes clear that discrimination 
against gay men, lesbians and bisexuals violates human 
rights law.
The express protection of lesbian, gay and bisexual 
people in the Charter was a pivotal moment in global 
LGB rights since none of the UN human rights treaties 
contained this express protection. The human rights of 
LGB people could no longer be ignored. As human be-
ings we had the same rights as everyone else, but on 
top of that, the Charter recognised we needed specific 
ners. If we leave the EU, we can only assume this rela-
tionship with other countries in advancing LGBTI rights 
will be weakened.
Once required to, Blair’s and Brown’s Governments 
dismantled LGBT inequality with gusto and Cameron’s 
coalition Government put the icing on the cake with 
equal marriage in England and Wales. Scotland imple-
mented same-sex marriage shortly after. Sadly marriage 
equality has been blocked in Northern Ireland, despite 
polling showing a clear support favour it. And so, the 
UK has gone beyond what has been required by EU law, 
but without that impetus, and also the recognition that 
LGBT equality is a vote winner, would our politicians of 
their own volition fought for our rights?
BREXIT: THE LGBT IMPACT ASSESSMENT LGBT RIGHTS AS BRITAIN PREPARES TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION
12
guarantees against discrimination.
Should the Charter have provided greater protection 
for trans people and those who do not conform to the 
more traditional gender constructs? Protection from 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity was not 
included, but as EU law is clear that trans people are 
protected on the ground of sex, is additional protection 
required? Might express reference to gender identity 
have diluted the protection provided for by the pro-
hibition on sex discrimination? Alternatively, does the 
omission of gender identity as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination leave trans people and those who are 
gender-fluid vulnerable? As our understanding of the 
issues around gender identity grows, we may be able to 
provide the answers.
 
Article 21(1) of the EU Charter is worded as follows:
‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other opin-
ion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.’
issues around gender identity grows, we may be able to 
provide the answers.
 
Article 21(1) of the EU Charter is worded as follows:
‘A ny  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  b a s e d  o n  a ny 
g r o u n d  s u c h  a s  s e x ,  r a c e ,  c o l o u r, 
e t h n i c  o r  s o c i a l  o r i g i n ,  g e n e t i c 
f e a t u r e s ,  l a n g u a g e ,  r e l i g i o n  o r 
b e l i e f ,  p o l i t i c a l  o r  a ny  o t h e r 
o p i n i o n ,  m e m b e r s h i p  o f  a  n a t i o n a l 
m i n o r i t y,  p r o p e r t y,  b i r t h ,  d i s a b i l i t y, 
a g e  o r  s e x u a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  s h a l l  b e 
p r o h i b i t e d .’
CEMENTING LGBT 
RIGHTS
IN LAW
With the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, LGBT people in the EU secured their rights. 
Wherever EU law is engaged the Charter applies and, 
therefore, across the reach of all EU law, from asylum 
policy to health and safety, there can be no discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation or sex.
 
Without question, the Charter represents a high point 
of LGBT human rights protection in international law to 
date. Would the Charter have included the prohibition 
of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation 
without the inclusion of Article 13 in the Amsterdam 
Treaty back in 1997? The Council of Europe’s European 
Convention forbids discrimination in relation to the en-
joyment of the rights in the Convention, but the ECHR 
provision protecting against discrimination, Article 14, 
does not mention sexual orientation. In fact, it gives 
protection to LGBs, as ‘other status’ has consistently 
been interpreted as including sexual orientation. LGBT 
people have also been protected by the rights in the 
ECHR, most notably privacy rights. In the absence of 
Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty, would the drafters 
have felt sufficiently emboldened to include protection 
against sexual orientation discrimination in the Char-
ter? Would the ECHR have been enough of a basis for 
them to do that? It is unlikely. Because those MEPs had 
already done the groundwork, backed up by LGBT ac-
tivists, most notably ILGA Europe at this stage, includ-
ing sexual orientation in the Charter was straightfor-
ward, and at the time the Charter was drafted back in 
2000, this issue was not controversial for most member 
states and certainly not the UK.
 
Across the EU, LGBT communities are especially for-
tunate to have the protection of the Charter. In those 
countries that are less enlightened, LGBT people have 
access to this fundamental safeguard. In the UK, the 
Charter provides belt and braces protection. Gordon 
Brown’s Equality Act offers wide-ranging safeguards 
which go further in places than existing EU laws, but 
the Equality Act is not the same as the Charter. The 
Charter is the highest level of law within the EU. So if 
a member state is discriminating against LGBT people 
in the context of the rules of the EU, the prohibition on 
discrimination will trump and the Charter will protect 
those LGBT people from any discriminatory laws. Later 
in this report, we will show how the Charter has been 
used to protect the free movement rights of a married 
gay couple, one who is an EU citizen and the other not.
 
The LGBT communities in the UK are indebted to the 
EU for providing the basis for the equality we now en-
joy. LGBTIs in the UK had previously seen how gov-
ernments can enact draconian legislation against them. 
If we remained a member of the EU, our membership 
would be an effective block on such moves. For exam-
ple, a combination of EU anti-discrimination law and 
the EU Charter could not have countenanced Section 
28. Yet at the time, LGBT people in the UK were power-
less against the cruelty of those laws. Our fate was left 
to the political whims of Parliament.
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DOES EUROPE’S 
INABILITY TO 
PREVENT ALL 
ABUSES
UNDERMINE ITS SIGNIFICANCE?
Critics of the EU may point to member states which 
have failed to achieve the level of LGBTI inclusion we 
have in the UK, and thereby suggest EU membership is 
not the boon we hold it to be. It is worth examining that 
argument to identify what the EU has, in fact, done and 
what it is il l placed to do.
When we think about LGBTI rights in Europe, we of-
ten focus on specific marquee rights, such as ‘marriage 
equality’ or ‘gender recognition’. Some may point out 
the EU has never required member states to provide 
marriage equality or gender recognition and thereby 
suggest LGBTI people have little to lose from Brexit.
It is true the EU does not require gender recognition 
or equal marriage – both form part of national family 
law systems, which by and large fall outside the scope 
of EU law. However, as this report shows, EU law does 
cover a broad range of topics, including employment 
protection, asylum, and free movement.
The media tends to focus on the negative lived-experi-
ence of LGBTI citizens in EU countries, such as Hungary 
and Poland. But the rights we set out in this report (with 
notable exceptions where the UK has gone further than 
the EU) all equally apply to all LGBTI EU citizens, either 
because they have been incorporated into national law 
or because (where Member States do not incorporate 
rights) the rights are directly effective in the member 
state. When it comes to questions of sexual orientation 
and gender identity, this means LGBTI citizens have ac-
cess to EU law to defend their rights, even when the 
government in their country fails them or acts against 
them.
It’s also important to note that candidate countries to 
join the European Union have to radically change their 
legal system to ensure their sexual orientation and gen-
der identity rights are up to standard. The fact there is 
a standard legal framework of LGBT protections across 
Europe means that discrimination is less likely to place 
– both because it is censured and because those laws 
have fostered a culture of openness. Just as UK LGBT 
citizens stand to lose from Brexit, the fact that the EU 
is losing a broadly LGBT-supportive member from its 
ranks could, in the long-term, harm progress on ad-
vancing rights across Europe. And the most vulnerable 
LGBT Europeans are most likely to feel any such loss of 
positive influence most keenly. 
On the other hand, it is also true that some of the more 
sinister abuses of LGBTI rights, such as banning pub-
lic marches, may not fall within the scope of EU law, 
and therefore EU is comparatively ill-placed to respond. 
However, the fact that EU law does not solve all prob-
lems does not distract from the indisputable fact that 
it has meaningfully enhanced LGBT rights in countries. 
And, indeed, the EU (including the Commission, Parlia-
ment and Council) have responded to curbs on LGBT 
rights in Eastern Europe, and have placed institutional 
pressure on various governments.
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W H AT  W I L L 
L E AV I N G 
T H E  E U 
M E A N  F O R 
B R I T I S H  L G B T I 
P E O P L E?
PA R T  T W O
P
hoto by C
raig W
hitehead
IS BRITISH LAW 
SUFFICIENT 
TO PROTECT US?
And now we are leaving the EU. Will that mean a return 
to the bad old days where our rights become a political 
football? It shouldn’t, because we now have the Human 
Rights Act and the culture of rights which it has fos-
tered. And we also have the Equality Act. Additionally, 
most EU law is being retained post Brexit. However, the 
Government’s proposal is that the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights is to be jettisoned and will not remain 
part of UK law post Brexit.
 
Losing the Charter does matter because with it goes 
our belt and braces in relation to human rights pro-
tection. We are also removing from the UK’s jurisdic-
tion the only international binding legal instrument that 
expressly prohibits discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation in the text of the document. That is 
counter-intuitive. Were those who voted to leave the 
EU voting to take away LGBT rights without replacing 
those rights with something equal or better? It is un-
likely that was their intent.
 
And are the Human Rights Act and the Equality Act suf-
ficient to protect LGBT rights in the absence of hard-
edged EU human rights protection? The Government 
have proposed that EU human rights principles should 
remain post Brexit, that the principles will l inger some-
how in the ether, but these are not to be enforceable. 
It won’t be possible to bring a case on the basis that 
they’ve been violated. LGBT pension discrimination, for 
example, was only finally outlawed in the UK because 
Mr Walker brought a case and won on the grounds that 
his limited access to pension rights as a gay man violat-
ed EU principles. EU principles and the EU Charter are 
indistinguishable and it is disingenuous to suggest oth-
erwise. And as Mr Walker’s case proves and the Charter 
cases that will be discussed in the next section show, in 
the absence of clearly enforceable human rights, LGBT 
people are vulnerable to egregious forms of discrimi-
nation.
WHY SHOULD OUR 
COMMUNITY FEAR
RIGHTS MAY BE UNDERMINED?
In the absence of constitutional human rights protection 
in the UK, LGBT people will also be potentially at risk. 
The reality is that the Equality Act can be amended by 
a simple Act of Parliament and the current Government 
has consistently made clear that the Human Rights Act 
is up for grabs. Even the UK’s continued commitment to 
the European Convention of Human Rights is not guar-
anteed. When human rights are treated in such a cava-
lier manner, should the LGBT communities in the UK be 
concerned by the loss of the Charter? Lessons from his-
tory and our own experiences show us that obstacles to 
taking away rights should be encouraged. LGBT people 
need greater rights protections, not fewer. As our voice 
can be lost amongst multiple competing domestic in-
terests, we are safer within international organisations 
where our numbers are magnified and where also mul-
tiple courts are watching our backs. Our security was 
guaranteed when we could rely on a combination of 
courts, the UK’s, the EU’s and the European Court of 
Human Rights. Indeed, it took a case before the ECHR 
in order to decriminalise homosexuality in Northern Ire-
land in 1982.
 
As Parliament has historically legislated against us and 
has often required incentives from Europe to legislate 
to protect us, should we be concerned that we are 
leaving the EU and that our Government is expressing 
ambivalence towards the Council of Europe and its Eu-
ropean Convention? Comments from senior Conserva-
tives and members of the Cabinet suggest we should 
anticipate trouble ahead. It must be recalled that Iain 
Duncan Smith infamously declared that a Conservative 
Government would reinstate the blanket ban on gay 
men and lesbians serving in the armed forces if request-
ed by the MoD. So much for his respect for the rule 
of law and his commitment to human rights. And Chris 
Grayling has made his thoughts very clear in relation 
to bed and breakfast owners being required to accom-
modate gay men. They shouldn’t have to if that offends 
their beliefs.
 
Is the Human Rights Act (and the ECHR) sufficiently ro-
bust to challenge such developments if they were to oc-
cur? The Equality Act would be powerless in the face of 
such amendments passed through Parliament despite 
the inevitable indignation expressed by the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission.
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In this light, the loss of the EU Charter from UK law post 
Brexit is significant. That stark, unapologetic commit-
ment to non-discrimination in Article 21 will be missed. 
It may be that Grayling and Duncan Smith have also 
‘evolved’ and that there is no risk that LGBT equality 
could ever be questioned again, but we all know that 
is improbable. And, of course, there are technical legal 
arguments relating to the prospective scenarios identi-
fied above. But what is not in dispute is that the LGBT 
community remain vulnerable and therefore it is shock-
ing that the Government could consider taking away 
the only directly binding international document that 
expressly protects us without replacing it with some-
thing equally as good or better.
BREXIT HAS 
EVEN GREATER 
CONSEQUENCES
FOR LGBT PEOPLE
Will LGBT people be disproportionately affected by the 
UK leaving the EU? The loss of the Charter will affect 
everyone, but as LGBT people have no other express 
anti-discrimination protection, it will inevitably have 
more consequences for LGBT people. Leaving the EU 
will also affect everyone, but because of the nature of 
LGBT identity it may have a bigger impact on LGBT 
people. LGBT people are a small part of any community 
and therefore by becoming part of a bigger entity such 
as the EU, the numbers of LGBT people connected with 
the UK have inevitably increased. And because the UK 
has provided enhanced rights for LGBT people, this has 
also attracted more LGBT people to the UK.
 
To play up to stereotypes and to make sweeping gen-
eralisations, we LGBT people tend to be less parochial 
and more internationalist in our outlook. We look for 
communities beyond those that we were traditionally 
raised in. By and large, we celebrate difference and di-
versity. The opportunities of being part of a European 
Union – a community of neighbouring nations where we 
all share more that citizenship – made up of over 500 
million people are obvious to us and we have a clear-
er critique of the UK’s culture and traditions. We have 
our own distinct take when we look back through our 
rose-tinted glasses at Britain’s historic role in torment-
ing LGBT people. We continue to understand the need 
for international solidarity with LGBTI communities in 
countries where rights are not protected and guaran-
teed.
EU MEMBERSHIP 
ADVANTAGES
THAT LGBT PEOPLE STANT TO LOSE
LGBT people are likely to take advantage of most if not 
all the benefits that come with EU citizenship, whether 
that’s having a partner from another EU country or liv-
ing in another EU country with a partner from outside 
the EU. The loss of freedom of movement rights will be 
a huge shock to LGBT people currently in the UK. And 
so will giving up on the legal basis for our equality.
Once the UK embraced LGBT equality, the UK within the 
EU has also played a pivotal role in fostering wide-rang-
ing principles of LGBT equality across the Union. Those 
LGBT people in EU countries which only begrudgingly 
provide the minimum of equality mandated by the EU, 
will feel the UK’s absence. Their chances of enhanced 
equality will be reduced accordingly. 
The UK is now a key player in establishing LGBT rights 
globally. The EU is a huge global actor. The UK will miss 
the opportunities provided for by the European Exter-
nal Action Service in ending LGBT persecution. Were 
we to stay within the EU, we could have used our influ-
ence to prioritise LGBT rights internationally, including 
in relation to trade negotiations. Now that voice will 
be less distinct. The UK Government will have other 
priorities. 
The following analysis focuses in depth on how LGBT 
people will be affected by Brexit, but of course the rea-
soning applies to everyone. We will all lose so much. 
This analysis has been consciously selective. We look 
at six issues in some depth from the perspective of 
LGBT people: free movement, trans rights, employment 
rights, relationship rights, asylum, and rights under the 
charter.
There will be many other advantages to EU membership 
that are not covered here. What is more, this analysis 
focuses on LGBT people living in the UK. It does not 
consider is the future of UK LGBT citizens living in the 
EU after Brexit is finalised. 
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As noted, one of the most striking aspects of the Euro-
pean Union is the right which EU law confers upon all 
European citizens (including, until 31 March 2019, UK 
nationals) to travel and work freely across the 28 mem-
ber states. In its core treaty documents (Article 21(1) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), 
the EU guarantees that ‘[e]very citizen…shall have the 
right to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States’ subject to specified limitations.
 
While the question of migration and free movement 
proved to be a particularly divisive (and misunderstood) 
element of the Brexit debate, the EU’s free movement 
policies represent one of the most successful social and 
legal experiments of the past 70 years. Encouraging 
the cross-border flow of cultures and traditions, free 
movement has not only facilitated necessary emigra-
tion for many British LGBT persons (who, particularly 
in the 1970s and 1980s, experienced virulent queer-
phobia), it has also attracted new ideas and alternative 
opinions, which have helped to shape a new climate of 
openness and tolerance in the UK.
 
Free movement guarantees have an important impact 
on British LGBT persons who, when they move to an-
other member state for work, want assurances that they 
can travel with their spouse or civil partner – particular-
ly if the latter is not a European Union citizen. Indeed, 
the work/travel consequences of leaving the EU is a 
matter about which LGBT Britons should have especial 
concern. 
 
European Union work/travel rights are governed by a 
large body of primary and secondary EU legislation. 
However, in the context of LGBT families, the Citizen-
ship Directive (Directive 2004/38), which was adopted 
in 2004, is particularly significant. Article 7 of the Di-
rective permits (among other things) EU citizens to re-
side (for more than three months) in any member state 
so long as: (a) they are workers or are self-employed; 
or (b) have sufficient resources to avoid burdening the 
social welfare system and have comprehensive sickness 
insurance.
 
The right to reside (set out in Article 7) includes ‘fam-
ily member[s]’ who are, and are not, nationals of an-
other European Union country. For example, where a 
UK citizen, Julie, moves to Barcelona for employment, 
she will (as long as she satisfies the worker/resources 
requirements) be able to bring her ‘family member[s]’, 
irrespective of whether those latter are from Britain or 
from a jurisdiction outside the EU, such as Australia or 
Jamaica.
 
For same-sex couples, what is particularly striking is the 
LGBT-inclusive way in which EU institutions have de-
fined (and continue to interpret) the notion of family 
members for the purposes of free movement. In estab-
lishing the scope of ‘family member’ within the Citi-
zenship Directive, Article 2(2)(b) includes: ‘the partner 
with whom the Union citizen has contracted a regis-
tered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a 
Member State, if the legislation of the host Member 
State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to 
marriage.’ Thus, if a UK citizen, John, who is in a civil 
partnership with an American citizen, David, moves to 
Milan for work, EU law will allow David to also reside in 
Milan (Article 7(2)) as long as Italy treats its new Civil 
Union Law 2016 as equivalent to marriage. Once the 
United Kingdom leaves the European Union, John and 
David (and countless same-sex couples like them) will 
lose these travel/work safeguards, and will be subject 
to an as yet unknown (and possibly more disadvanta-
geous) regime.
 
However, the potential free movement losses for British 
LGBT couples may actually be even more momentous 
than is currently thought. At the very moment when the 
United Kingdom withdraws from the European project, 
EU courts appear ready to radically expand cross-bor-
der protections for same-sex couples.
 
In addition to protecting same-sex registered partners 
who travel to another EU member state (as long as the 
host country recognises civil unions), the Citizenship 
Directive also includes spouses within the definition of 
‘family member’ (Article 2(a)(a)). Furthermore, in Article 
3(2)(b), the directive obliges member states, ‘in accor-
dance with [their] national legislation’ to facilitate ‘en-
try and residence for...the partner with whom the Union 
citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested.’
In a recent, landmark opinion (Coman v Inspectoratul 
General pentru Imigrări), Advocate General Wathelet 
has recommended that, for the purposes of Article 2(2)
(a), a ‘spouse’ must include ‘a national of a third State 
of the same sex as the citizen of the European Union 
to whom he or she is married.’ Similarly, the Advocate 
General has also suggested that member states should 
not be able to refuse residence to partners in a dura-
ble relationship ‘based on the sexual orientation of the 
person concerned.’
If adopted by the European Court of Justice, Advocate 
FREE MOVEMENT
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General Wathelet’s recommendations have the poten-
tial to radically reform EU same-sex free movement 
rights. Such a judgment from the Luxembourg Court 
would – as much as any other legal rule – highlight what 
UK LGBT persons (and their partners) are losing through 
the Brexit process.
 
Returning to an example from above, the Advocate 
General’s analysis would mean that, where John, the UK 
national, and David, the American national, marry in the 
United Kingdom, David would be entitled to accompa-
ny John to Italy, irrespective of whether the Italian state 
acknowledges same-gender marriage. Although Article 
2(2)(b) of the Citizenship Directive only requires Italy to 
welcome David (as a civil partner) if Italian law also ac-
cepts civil unions as equivalent to marriage, Advocate 
General Wathelet’s opinion would mean that – where 
John and David have lawfully married in the UK – they 
fall within the definition of ‘spouse’ for the purposes of 
the right to reside even though Italy does not yet per-
mit same-sex marriage.
 
This will have particular significance if John’s employers 
require him to move to an EU country, such as Lithuania, 
where there is currently no same-sex relationship recog-
nition – marriage or civil partnership. In such a scenario, 
there would obviously be no obligation on Lithuania to 
allow David to reside as a civil partner, as the Lithuanian 
state does not also recognise civil partnership as an 
institution equivalent to marriage. However, John and 
David would still be able to move together because, 
David – as John’s spouse within the meaning of the Cit-
izenship Directive – has an acknowledged right to re-
side. Leaving the European Union, UK LGBT individuals 
will be deprived of the benefit of this potentially trans-
formative enhancement of same-sex free movement 
guarantees.
The earlier sections of this report have already noted 
how the European Union (and, in particular, EU equality 
law) has played an important role in advancing trans-
gender rights in the United Kingdom.
In the landmark case (mentioned above) from 1996, P v 
TRANSGENDER 
RIGHTS
S and Cornwall County Council, a transgender woman 
claimed that she had been unlawfully dismissed by her 
employer (a local authority) because of her gender iden-
tity. The UK employment tribunal was uncertain whether 
the county council’s actions – if the allegations could 
be proven – qualified as impermissible discrimination. 
At the time, UK domestic law did not explicitly prohib-
it employers from terminating the contracts of workers 
who expressed a transgender identity. Seeking clarity, 
the UK judges asked the European Court of Justice for 
guidance – specifically whether, under EU law, firing an 
employee because she undertakes, or proposes to un-
dertake, a process of ‘gender reassignment’ amounts to 
sex discrimination.
 
The Luxembourg judges responded in the affirmative, 
observing that sex discrimination within the scope of EU 
employment law (Directive 76/207, now replaced by Di-
rective 2006/54) includes ‘discrimination arising…from 
the gender reassignment of the person concerned.’ If 
an employer mistreats or fires their worker because that 
worker undertakes a process of gender reassignment, 
the employer’s conduct is ‘based, essentially if not 
exclusively, on…sex.’ Just as one cannot discriminate 
against a cisgender female employee because of her 
sex, so too employers should also not disfavour or fire 
transgender individuals because they transition. 
 
In subsequent years, both the European Court of Jus-
tice and the EU legislature has built upon the rights set 
out in P v S.
 
In Richards v Secretary for State for Work and Pensions, 
a transgender woman, who had undertaken a process 
of gender reassignment, was denied a pension at the 
age of 60 years because, prior to the Gender Recogni-
tion Act 2004, the UK refused to legally acknowledge 
her female gender. The ECJ stated that withholding the 
correct pension from Ms Richards, who had done every-
thing she could to affirm her identity, constituted unlaw-
ful sex discrimination. Similarly, in KB v NHS Pensions 
Agency, the Luxembourg judges stated that Article 157 
TFEU (formerly Article 141 EC), which relates to equal 
pay between men and women, precludes laws which 
prevented a transgender man from marrying his female 
partner and benefiting from that partner’s employment 
remuneration. In terms of EU legislation, there is explic-
it affirmation that the ‘principle of equal treatment for 
men and women…also applies to discrimination arising 
from the gender reassignment of a person.’
 
P v S was a hugely significant moment – for all LGBT 
persons in the United Kingdom, but particularly for 
transgender communities. The decision made clear that, 
irrespective of whether Parliament was independently 
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willing to protect workers who undertake a process of 
gender reassignment (something it was clearly unwill-
ing to do in 1996), transgender employees could still 
rely upon EU employment guarantees – guarantees 
that are (until Brexit) directly enforceable in the United 
Kingdom.
 
The judgment in P v S (and the subsequent case law 
and legislation) has forced the hand of consecutive UK 
governments to affirm and protect transgender rights. 
During a period of time where the European Court of 
Human Rights continued to legitimise the absence of 
gender recognition laws in the United Kingdom, it was 
PvS which required the Sex Discrimination (Gender Re-
assignment) Regulations 1999. The 1999 Regulations 
introduced legal equality guarantees for transgender 
employees, and paved the way for the current stand-
alone protection of ‘gender reassignment’ in Section 7 
of the Equality Act 2010.
 
Understanding the origins of Section 7 (and the resid-
ual scrutiny which the EU has continued to exercise in 
recent decades) is important to fully appreciate the po-
tential consequences of leaving the European Union. 
Post-referendum, many observers have rejected sug-
gestions that Brexit will substantially impact transgen-
der rights in this country. Their argument is that, with 
the Equality Act 2010, transgender populations (includ-
ing transgender workers) have all the protections that 
they need. Yet, such assertions ignore the fact that EU 
law is the justification for including transgender iden-
tities within our current equality framework. Although 
Parliament may choose to enact legal guarantees which 
extend beyond the minimum floor of EU protections, 
law-makers cannot – while we are still members of the 
Union – violate certain core, baseline guarantees.
 
When the United Kingdom leaves the European Union, 
Section 7 of the Equality Act (the legacy of EU mem-
bership) will still be in place. There will, however, be 
no impediment to future parliaments successively chip-
ping away at Section 7 rights. And, while no serious 
commentator expects MPs to immediately launch a 
wholesale assault on existing transgender protections 
(certainly not within the lifetime of this Parliament), it 
is – especially within the current political climate sur-
rounding single-gender spaces – more than foreseeable 
that, freed from the constraints of EU scrutiny, future 
legislators could (in perhaps small but significant ways) 
reduce transgender non-discrimination rights. For those 
observers who believe that the European Convention 
on Human Rights can provide an adequate, substitute 
protection (if needed), the Strasbourg judges have 
rarely addressed transgender rights through the lens 
of non-discrimination (Article 14 ECHR) and, when they 
have done so, the results have been (at best) mixed (PV 
v Spain, Hamalainen v Finland).
The same reasoning – set out in the preceding sec-
tion – applies to existing employment protections on 
the basis of sexual orientation. EU Directive 2000/78 
(known as the ‘Framework Equality Directive’) estab-
lishes a broad framework for prohibiting workplace dis-
crimination against gay, lesbian and bisexual employ-
ees. As has already been discussed, Directive 2000/78 
was the product of a landmark decision, enshrined in 
Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam and opposed by 
John Major’s government, to include combatting sexu-
al orientation discrimination within the competences of 
the European Union. This commitment to safeguarding 
against sexual orientation has now been reaffirmed in 
Articles 10 and 19 TFEU, and is an express aim of the 
‘policies and activities’ of the Union.
 
In the United Kingdom, Directive 2000/78 directly re-
sulted in the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003 – the first time sexual orientation was 
explicitly protected in British employment law (rein-
forcing the transformative role which EU law has played 
in enhancing LGBT rights in this country). The directive 
is now given effect through the Equality Act 2010. 
 
As with ‘gender reassignment’ protections, it is import-
ant to understand the historical development of sexual 
orientation protections within the Equality Act 2010 so 
as to fully appreciate how leaving the European Union 
might (negatively) impact LGB workers. Post-Brexit, in-
dividuals who experience workplace inequality because 
of their sexual orientation will continue to enjoy sub-
stantial legal protection. Yet, the key question is: to 
what extent will existing safeguards in UK domestic law 
be maintained once we withdraw from our current EU 
obligations. Once again, there is no reasonable fear 
that, on 31 March 2019, Parliament will sweep away 
the entire employment equality framework as it as ap-
plies to gay, lesbian and bisexual persons. On the other 
hand, however, there is a genuine risk that – if Britain 
descends into a race-to-the-bottom ‘business compet-
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itiveness’ culture – LGB employment guarantees will 
be subtly, but significantly, curtailed. And, without the 
core baseline obligations of EU law, lesbian, gay and bi-
sexual workers will have few legal avenues for redress.
 
Of course, one of the striking features of the Equality 
Act 2010 (building upon the earlier Equality Act (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2007) is that it extends sexu-
al orientation non-discrimination guarantees to the re-
ceipt of services and education. Under Section 85, for 
example, a secondary school in Manchester would not 
be able to deny admission to a pupil merely because 
they are gay, lesbian or bisexual. Similarly, Section 29 
would prevent a restaurant owner in Bristol from refus-
ing service to a female couple merely because they are 
lesbians.
 
Unlike sexual orientation ‘employment’ protections, the 
UK’s LGB guarantees in the sphere of services and ed-
ucation are not a consequence of EU intervention. Eu-
ropean Union LGB safeguards do not currently extend 
beyond workplace equality, although there is currently 
a proposal for a new equal treatment directive, which 
would expand EU guarantees into spheres, such as ser-
vices and education. Rather, just like the issue of same-
sex marriage (discussed below), sexual orientation 
rights for entering/enjoying services and education are 
the result of a domestic political settlement – a deci-
sion by the UK Parliament that gay, lesbian and bisexual 
persons should not experience discrimination when ac-
cessing their basic needs. This being the case, however, 
the potential impact of Brexit on LGB school children, 
or the lesbian couple dining in the Bristol restaurant, 
remains unclear.
 
On the one hand, there is an argument that leaving the 
European Union will have little effect. Although, both 
before and after March 2019, Parliament has no obliga-
tion to confer protection on LGB recipients of services 
and education, it has chosen to offer those safeguards. 
There is no reason why exiting the EU will encourage 
MPs to withdraw sexual orientation guarantees which 
were never dependent upon EU membership.
 
Yet, on the other hand, it would be a mistake to under-
estimate the influence of the EU project on British cul-
ture, especially in terms of fostering openness. There is 
a fear that, as the UK turns its back on the EU, so too 
there will be a movement away from the values of tol-
erance and respect. Within this changed environment, 
there is genuine potential for amendments to existing 
sexual orientation non-discrimination rights. On the is-
sue of religious exemptions to LGB equality, for exam-
ple, which enjoys considerable support in more con-
servative political quarters, although EU law has never 
prohibited the introduction of broad exceptions for 
service providers who reject LGB clientele, exiting the 
Union may provide the catalyst for (or encourage) a det-
rimental change in the law. As, having left the Union, 
the UK will never be bound by future, more-expansive 
equality legislation (once it is enacted), there will be lit-
tle recourse for gay, lesbian and bisexual communities.
One area of LGBT rights where Brexit does not – at 
least at first glance – appear to have a substantial im-
pact is marriage equality. Although Article 9 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
does not specifically prohibit same-sex marital unions, 
neither does it require member states to move beyond 
a traditional (different-sex) definition of marriage.
 
The passage of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 
2013 – the legislation which currently allows people of 
the same legal gender to marry in England and Wales 
– was not a consequence of Britain’s membership of 
the European Union (nor, indeed, was it necessitated 
by the European Convention on Human Rights which, 
as currently interpreted, does not guarantee marriage 
equality although it increasingly affirms rights to some 
form of partnership recognition). Instead, as noted 
above, same-sex marriage in England, Scotland and 
Wales (Northern Ireland remaining conspicuously ab-
sent) is the result of a political compromise, whereby 
politicians in Westminster and Holyrood agreed that, 
as a matter of English and Scottish policy, it was right 
that LGB couples should be entitled to enter a civil 
marriage. What this means, however, is that, when Brit-
ain leaves the EU on 31 March 2019, there is – without 
a fundamental shift in that compromise – unlikely to be 
serious legislative attempts to exclude same-sex rela-
tionships from marital frameworks.
 
Acknowledging the limited role which the Union has 
played in UK marriage debates, it would nevertheless 
be wrong to absolutely disregard the influence which 
EU law has had in the sphere of relationship recogni-
tion.
 
RELATIONSHIP 
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In a series of landmark cases (Maruko, Romer and 
Hay) from 2008 to 2013, the European Court of Jus-
tice significantly limited the extent to which employers 
and state authorities can distinguish – on questions of 
work-related pay and benefits – between employees 
in heterosexual marriages and those in same-sex civil 
partnerships, in circumstances where same-sex couples 
cannot marry but where their civil partnership places 
them in a legally and factually comparable situation to 
spouses.
 
In Hay v Credit Agricole Mutuel, for example, the ECJ 
found that there could be unlawful discrimination based 
on sexual orientation if an employer reserved certain 
benefits, such as a bonus, for workers who married, in 
a situation where workers, who entered a same-sex civil 
partnership (PACS), did not enjoy these benefits, even 
though: (a) they were excluded from marriage; (b) the 
PACS was the only form of legal relationship available 
in France; and (c) it placed partners in a comparable 
situation with spouses for the purposes of receiving the 
benefits. Similarly, in Romer, the ECJ held that there 
could also be no discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation if a pensioner, who has entered into a same-sex 
registered partnership, receives a lower supplementary 
retirement pension than an individual, who has entered 
a heterosexual marriage, where gay couples are exclud-
ed from marriage and the pensioner is, for the purpos-
es of the retirement pension, in a comparable situation 
with a married spouse.
 
For same-sex couples in the United Kingdom, cases 
such as, Hay and Romer, were particularly important 
pre-2014 because, although marital unions were be-
yond reach, such couples could enter civil partnerships 
and, under UK law, that latter institution clearly placed 
civil partners and spouses in a comparable legal and 
factual situation for work-related benefits.
 
Indeed, while EU law has not required the United King-
dom to adopt marriage equality (as the continuing vac-
uum in Northern Ireland illustrates) the aforementioned 
case law has assisted (in a 2017 dispute decided by the 
UK Supreme Court, Walker v Innospec) to close (per-
haps the most gaping) disparity, which continued to ex-
ist between different-sex and same-sex couples after 
the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013.
 
Schedule 9, paragraph 18 of the Equality Act 2010 pro-
vides that ‘a person does not contravene…this Act, so 
far as relating to sexual orientation, by doing anything 
which prevents or restricts a person…from having ac-
cess to a benefit, facility or service… (A) the right to 
which accrued before 5 December 2005 (the day on 
which Section 1 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 came 
into force).’ In Walker, the appellant, John Walker, had 
worked for the same company, Innospec Ltd, for a pe-
riod of 23 years. Until Mr Walker retired in 2003, he 
had made consistent contributions to the company’s 
occupational pension scheme. From the early 1990s, 
Mr Walker had lived with his male partner. The couple 
entered into a civil union in 2006, and later converted 
their relationship to a legal marriage. 
 
Despite the longevity of his service, the consistent con-
tributions which he made and the couple’s formalisa-
tion of their relationship, Mr Walker was informed that 
– on the basis of the exemptions set out in Schedule 9, 
paragraph 18 – Innospec would not pay a full survivors 
pension should Mr Walker pre-decease his spouse. This 
was in spite of the fact that, had Mr Walker carried on 
precisely the same relationship history with a woman 
(including entering a formal relationship on the same 
date), Innospec would have honoured the full pension 
entitlement.
 
Drawing upon the protection of EU law, the Supreme 
Court disapplied Schedule 9, paragraph 18, to the ex-
tent that it permitted restricted payments (to same-sex 
spouses) of benefits which accrued prior to December 
2005. Such a restriction – grounded in the sexual orien-
tation of the couple – was incompatible with Directive 
2000/78 and the general principle of non-discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.
 
In the context of Brexit, and looking at the case through 
the lens of LGBT rights, it is important to understand 
that – had this litigation been brought in 2022 – Mr 
Walker and his spouse would have been unlikely to ob-
tain a remedy. In particular, the couple could not have 
relied upon UK domestic law to further their arguments 
because, somewhat paradoxically, it was actually the 
Equality Act 2010 which sanctioned their unequal treat-
ment. The case is a stark reminder of both the existing 
protection (and possible future protections) of which 
LGBT Britons will be deprived through the Brexit pro-
cess.
 
In recent months, this deprivation has been re-empha-
sised by Advocate General Bobek’s recommendation 
– in MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions – 
that the UK government’s historical withholding of an 
earlier retirement pension, from a transgender woman 
who refused to annul her marriage to a cisgender fe-
male spouse (thus forfeiting her right to obtain a Gen-
der Recognition Certificate under the original terms of 
the Gender Recognition Act 2004) constitutes imper-
missible direct discrimination on the basis of sex. The 
Advocate General’s opinion is particularly significant 
because, under the European Convention of Human 
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Rights (which is the human rights structure upon which 
LGBT individuals will have to rely post-Brexit), a similar 
divorce requirement (in Finland) has been upheld as a 
proportionate interference with private and family life. 
One final issue to consider is the potentially negative 
impact which Brexit will have upon LGBT individuals 
who navigate the UK’s complex asylum application pro-
cedures. In HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, the UK Supreme Court 
declared that the British government cannot deport 
gay, lesbian and bisexual asylum applicants to their 
country of origin if the only way those individuals will 
avoid persecution is suppressing their sexual orienta-
tion. The judgment in HJ and HT recognises sexuality as 
an inherent aspect of self, and acknowledges that gay, 
lesbian and bisexual persons should not have to hide 
their identity to enjoy core, fundamental rights.
HJ and HT was largely welcomed by LGBT immigration 
advocates and, indeed, its reasoning was followed by 
the European Court of Justice when that court confront-
ed a similar issue in X, Y and Z v Minister voor Immigratie 
en Asiel. However, while the decision creates stronger 
protections for individuals who can prove a well-found-
ed fear of persecution based on sexual orientation, it 
also encouraged stricter controls on the issue of ‘credi-
bility’. While border authorities are now more willing to 
embrace persons whose LGB identity they accept, they 
have also instituted more rigorous assessment process-
es, applying stringent burdens on those who express a 
gay, lesbian and bisexual orientation.
 
The introduction of stricter ‘credibility’ tests surround-
ing sexual orientation has resulted in allegations of 
troubling rights violations. Stories of applicants being 
asked improper questions, using context-inappropriate 
terminology, and of applicants feeling compelled to 
provide highly-sensitive personal materials (including 
explicit photographs) became widespread in the media 
and in academic reports.
 
In recent years, however, the European Court of Justice 
has taken significant steps to counteract the imposition 
of unfair, undignified and inappropriate credibility tests. 
In A, B and C v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justi-
ASYLUM LAW 
tie, the Court held that, under EU law, LGB-identified 
individuals cannot be asked sexually explicit questions 
by immigration officials, who must also refuse to accept 
intimate evidence (sexual photos, videos, etc.) which 
applicants may offer. Having regard to the difficulty 
which some people may confront in externalising their 
sexual orientation, the ECJ has made clear that member 
states cannot absolutely reject credibility where there 
is a failure to disclose LGB status at the first available 
opportunity. In the recent case of F v Bevándorlási és 
Állampolgársági Hivatal, the Luxembourg judges have 
limited the extent to which national authorities can use 
expert evidence to determine sexual orientation.
 
While none of the ECJ cases have specifically ad-
dressed the United Kingdom, the judgments have 
great importance for practice in this country. That fact 
is particularly so considering that the European Court 
of Human Rights has taken a strikingly more conser-
vative, and less interventionist, approach to LGB ap-
plications. Decisions, such as A, B and C are regularly 
pleaded, and must be enforced, by UK authorities. The 
reasoning of the Luxembourg judges is now evident in 
the Home Office’s guidance: Asylum Policy Instruction: 
Sexual Orientation in Asylum Claims, which was circu-
lated in August 2016. However, perhaps more than any-
thing else, ECJ supervision creates a minimum floor of 
protection which, although not eradicating the many 
problems which LGBT applicants experience in the UK 
asylum framework, at least establishes core guarantees 
towards which immigration authorities must aspire. 
Leaving the European Union – particularly within a re-
surgent climate of anti-migration – there is a risk that 
the plight of LGBT asylum applicants (and the structur-
al indignities they confront) will only be reinforced in 
post-Brexit Britain.
In recent years, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union has increasingly applied the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights to the legal concerns of LGBT persons. 
This evolving trend in protecting sexual orientation and 
gender identity rights highlights the significant loss 
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which LGBT Britons will experience if – as currently 
expected – the UK fails to retain Charter guarantees 
post-Brexit.  
 
Throughout this report, there has already been frequent 
reference to landmark cases in which the CJEU has ap-
plied Charter protections to LGBT populations. Use of 
the Charter has been particularly striking in the sphere 
of asylum law. In X, Y and Z v Minister voor Immigratie 
en Asiel, the Luxembourg judges held that imprisoning 
individuals for engaging in homosexual activities could 
constitute an act of persecution within the meaning of 
Article 9(1) of the Qualification Directive. Such impris-
onment would violate Article 8 ECHR (to which Article 
7 of the Charter corresponds) and would be a ‘punish-
ment which is disproportionate and discriminatory with-
in the meaning of Article 9(2)(c) of the Directive.’ This 
opens asylum in the EU for LGBTI people from those 
countries.
 
In the subsequent judgment, A, B and C v Staatssecre-
taris van Veiligheid en Justitie, the European Court of 
Justice stated that, while national immigration authori-
ties can make enquiries to ‘determine the facts and cir-
cumstances as regards the declared sexual orientation 
of an applicant for asylum’, those officials violate Arti-
cle 7 of the Charter by posing questions on the sexual 
practices in which applicants engage. Similarly, allow-
ing applicants to submit to homosexuality ‘tests’ or to 
produce evidence of intimate acts is incompatible with 
human dignity, as enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter. 
In the recent decision, F v Bevándorlási és Állampo-
lgársági Hivatal, the ECJ stated that Article 4 of Di-
rective 2011/95, read in the light of Article 7 of the 
Charter, prohibits using psychologists’ reports (based 
on projective personality testing) to determine the ve-
racity of sexual orientation where an individual applies 
for sexual orientation.
 
The CJEU has also applied the Charter to LGBT issues 
outside immigration and asylum law. In Leger – which 
concerned the permissibility of France’s lifetime ban 
on blood donations from men-who-have-sex-with-men 
– the Court held that the French law (by focusing on 
the homosexual conduct of gay men) may ‘discriminate 
against homosexuals on grounds of sexual orientation 
within the meaning of Article 21(1) of the Charter.’ On 
the question of whether such a ban can be propor-
tionate (Article 52(1) of the Charter), the Luxembourg 
judges observed there may be alternative (less oner-
ous) mechanisms for ensuring a ‘a high level of health 
protection to recipients’ which would render a lifetime 
ban unnecessary.   
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The  UK Government  and  Par l i ament  shou ld :
 
1. Recognize there are particular impacts on LGBT people of leaving the EU and ensure these negative effects 
are minimized.
2. Reconsider retaining membership of the Single Market, which contains significant benefits for LGBTI and 
other citizens, and without which it will be easier for LGBTI rights to be undermined in future.
3. Acknowledge that LGBTI people may be more likely to exercise their EU freedom of movement rights, includ-
ing by having a partner from elsewhere in the EU. And therefore work with the EU to minimize any obstruc-
tions to freedom of movement, including the recognition of LGBTI partners and families.
4. Retain the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
5. If the Charter cannot be retained, the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in 
relation to retained EU law must be expressly stated in UK law.
6. Undertake to hold a second referendum on the terms of the Brexit deal, including the option to remain in 
the EU, to allow LGBTI citizens and others to make an informed choice once the full facts and final deal are 
known.
7. Ensure all future trade deals respect LGBT equality.
8. Recognise that the EU currently provides the highest possible protections in international law for LGBT 
people and, if Britain is to leave, ensure that the UK continues to drive forward higher standards in LGBTI 
equality in future.
9. Recognise the EU provides a framework where the UK contributes positively to LGBTI rights in Europe and 
beyond. Further recognise the UK has a particular responsibility to further LGBTI equality internationally. 
Therefore, if the UK exits the EU, it must create strategic partnerships with other LGBTI-positive countries to 
continue to promote decriminalisation, equality, freedom and protection worldwide.
 
Bus inesses /  o rgan i sa t ions  shou ld  cons ider :
1. Lobbying government to ensure the UK does not descend into a race-to-the-bottom ‘business competitive-
ness’ culture in which LGBTI employment or consumer protections are reduced or curtailed.
2. Incorporating non-discrimination protections into their own policies to provide an alternative framework for 
protection, should a future UK government undermine protections for LGBTI post Brexit.
3. Affirming the importance of LGBTI inclusion in terms of performance and competitiveness, particularly where 
that may come under attack.
4. Review any LGBTI employee or customer policies and procedures which may be impacted by Brexit, and 
mitigate against negative consequences in so far as is possible.
 
I nd iv idua l s  shou ld  cons ider :
1. Writing to your MP to solicit their help in ensuring the level of protection LGBT people have now as EU mem-
bers is not diminished by leaving the EU. 
2. If in a civil partnership, investigate whether the –final Brexit deal has an impact on the recognition of that 
partnership in EU member states and consider using the existing framework to change the partnership status 
to marriage if that gives greater protection.
3. Where you can apply for citizenship of another EU country, for example through dual nationality or if you 
have an EU citizen as a partner, consider applying for a passport to that state to retain the benefits of EU 
citizenship.
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